Improving schools through school choice: an experimental study of deferred acceptance

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108853zbMath1429.91236OpenAlexW2977696246WikidataQ126783857 ScholiaQ126783857MaRDI QIDQ2292817

Flip Klijn, Marc Vorsatz, Joana Pais

Publication date: 5 February 2020

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://rem.rc.iseg.ulisboa.pt/wps/pdf/REM_WP_098_2019.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitymatchingdeferred acceptanceschool choiceschool quality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Heterogeneous agent models (91B69) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
• School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms
• Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: evidence from the residency match
• Cognitive ability and games of school choice
• Self-selection in school choice
• Contracts are not salaries in the hidden-substitutes domain
• Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
• School choice: an experimental study
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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