On the probability of electing the Condorcet loser

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(93)90046-LzbMath0769.90026OpenAlexW2072240764MaRDI QIDQ2366194

Dominique Lepelley

Publication date: 29 June 1993

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(93)90046-l

zbMATH Keywords

approval votingplurality votingvoting systemsCondorcet loser

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (15)

A note on approval voting and electing the Condorcet loser ⋮ Weighted scoring elections: is Borda best? ⋮ The likelihood of single-peaked preferences under classic and new probability distribution assumptions ⋮ The expected likelihood of transitivity for probabilistic choosers with single-peaked preferences ⋮ From Gehrlein-Fishburn’s Method on Frequency Representation to a Direct Proof of Ehrhart’s extended Conjecture ⋮ IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report ⋮ Finding sharper distinctions for conditions of transitivity of the majority method. ⋮ The geometry of Black's single peakedness and related conditions ⋮ Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis ⋮ On the probability of observing Borda's paradox ⋮ The scoring rules in an endogenous election ⋮ Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences ⋮ The likelihood of monotonicity paradoxes in run-off elections ⋮ Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser ⋮ The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser

Cites Work

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• Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules
• Majority efficiencies for simple voting procedures: Summary and interpretation
• Probabilities of election outcomes for large electorates

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