Resolving indeterminacy in coordination games: A new approach applied to a pay-as-you-go pension scheme

DOI10.1007/s00712-007-0256-4zbMath1180.91072OpenAlexW2161781635MaRDI QIDQ2385086

Luigi Bonatti

Publication date: 11 October 2007

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-007-0256-4

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectionglobal gamesprinciple of insufficient reasonrational beliefseductive viewpoint

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Applications of game theory (91A80)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Balanced-budget rules and macroeconomic (in)stability
• Equilibrium selection in \(n\)-person coordination games
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
• COORDINATION ON SADDLE-PATH SOLUTIONS: THE EDUCTIVE VIEWPOINT—LINEAR UNIVARIATE MODELS
• Anchoring Economic Predictions in Common Knowledge
• Prior Probabilities

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