Characterization of social choice sets in terms of individuals' maximal sets: the fixed agenda framework

DOI10.1007/S003550000063zbMath1069.91565OpenAlexW1964625459MaRDI QIDQ2388789

Josep E. Peris, M. Carmen Sánchez

Publication date: 20 September 2005

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550000063

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

Hierarchies of power in non-binary social choice ⋮ A foundation for Pareto optimality ⋮ Collective choice rules with social maximality

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