Jointly stable matchings

DOI10.1007/S10878-019-00402-4zbMath1425.90099OpenAlexW2924910218MaRDI QIDQ2424832

Shuichi Miyazaki, Kazuya Okamoto

Publication date: 25 June 2019

Published in: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2017/8224/

zbMATH Keywords

NP-completenesslinear time algorithmstable marriage problemstable matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Abstract computational complexity for mathematical programming problems (90C60) Combinatorial optimization (90C27)

Related Items (3)

Stable matching with multilayer approval preferences: approvals can be harder than strict preferences ⋮ Stable matching with multilayer approval preferences: approvals can be harder than strict preferences ⋮ Strongly stable and maximum weakly stable noncrossing matchings

Cites Work

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• Bistable versions of the marriages and roommates problems
• Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences
• The Complexity of Counting Stable Marriages
• On the Complexity of Timetable and Multicommodity Flow Problems
• A simply exponential upper bound on the maximum number of stable matchings
• Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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