On take it or leave it offers in common agency

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2012.07.039zbMath1283.91007OpenAlexW1984828077MaRDI QIDQ2440447

Seungjin Han

Publication date: 18 March 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/rsrch/papers/archive/2010-04.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designcommon agencymenustake-it-or-leave-it offers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences
• Erratum to ``Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency: [Journal of economic theory 111 (2003) 88--109]
• Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency.
• A folk theorem for competing mechanisms

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