Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.017zbMath1283.91095OpenAlexW3125924898MaRDI QIDQ2439808

Patrick W. Schmitz

Publication date: 17 March 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/45243/1/MPRA_paper_45243.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete contractstheory of the firmownershipinvestment incentivesrelationship-specificity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (1)

Investment spillovers and the allocation of property rights

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
• Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
• Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
• Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm
• Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?

This page was built for publication: Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach