The broken Borda rule and other refinements of approval ranking

DOI10.1007/s00355-021-01356-5zbMath1485.91083OpenAlexW3186187321MaRDI QIDQ2667582

Yves Sprumont, Guy Barokas

Publication date: 4 March 2022

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01356-5

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

Majority-approval social choice ⋮ A non-lexicographic rule in the preference-approval setting ⋮ A family of distances for preference-approvals

Cites Work

• An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation
• Approval voting and Arrow's impossibility theorem
• Approval as an Intrinsic Part of Preference
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