Plurality Voting with Truth-Biased Agents

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-41392-6_3zbMath1319.91071OpenAlexW40976406MaRDI QIDQ2856129

David R. M. Thompson, Evangelos Markakis, Svetlana Obraztsova

Publication date: 23 October 2013

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41392-6_3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (8)

Equilibria of Plurality Voting: Lazy and Truth-Biased Voters ⋮ Iterative voting and acyclic games ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting ⋮ Strong and Weak Acyclicity in Iterative Voting ⋮ Strategyproof judgment aggregation under partial information ⋮ Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for \(k\)-approval voting rules ⋮ Strategic manipulation in judgment aggregation under higher-level reasoning

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