Sampling and Representation Complexity of Revenue Maximization

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_22zbMath1406.91171arXiv1402.4535OpenAlexW2146268012MaRDI QIDQ2936993

Noam Nisan, Li Han, Shaddin Dughmi

Publication date: 7 January 2015

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1402.4535

zbMATH Keywords

computational complexity of samplesrevenue-maximizing auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17)

Related Items (8)

The Limitations of Optimization from Samples ⋮ Buy-many mechanisms are not much better than item pricing ⋮ The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation ⋮ On the Complexity of Optimal Lottery Pricing and Randomized Mechanisms for a Unit-Demand Buyer ⋮ Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items ⋮ A simple mechanism for a budget-constrained buyer ⋮ A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements ⋮ Selling multiple correlated goods: revenue maximization and menu-size complexity

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