Weakly Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games With Private Monitoring

DOI10.3982/ECTA8480zbMath1217.91014MaRDI QIDQ3019440

Michihiro Kandori

Publication date: 28 July 2011

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesrecursive structurebelief-free equilibriumprivate monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (6)

Conditional Markov equilibria in discounted dynamic games ⋮ What you get is what you see: cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs ⋮ Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring ⋮ Learning from private information in noisy repeated games ⋮ Instability of belief-free equilibria ⋮ Learning a population distribution

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