Recipient Choice Can Address the Efficiency-Equity Trade-off in Kidney Transplantation: A Mechanism Design Model

DOI10.1287/mnsc.1060.0541zbMath1232.90294OpenAlexW2107430902MaRDI QIDQ3116007

Stefanos A. Zenios, Xuanming Su

Publication date: 21 February 2012

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/606463366e781a82cfb81d21fc14007bbd3e9128

zbMATH Keywords

fluid queuesachievable regionskidney allocationdesign hidden informationefficiency-equitytrade-off mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Case-oriented studies in operations research (90B90) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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