Polymatroid Prophet Inequalities
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Publication:3452806
DOI10.1007/978-3-662-48350-3_37zbMath1466.68087arXiv1307.5299MaRDI QIDQ3452806
Paul Dütting, Robert D. Kleinberg
Publication date: 19 November 2015
Published in: Algorithms - ESA 2015 (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1307.5299
90C27: Combinatorial optimization
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91B44: Economics of information
68W27: Online algorithms; streaming algorithms
91B03: Mechanism design theory
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