In Defence of Objective Bayesianism

DOI10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199228003.001.0001zbMath1196.00021OpenAlexW596488402MaRDI QIDQ3569945

Jon Williamson

Publication date: 22 June 2010

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199228003.001.0001

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophy of mathematics (00A30) Logic of natural languages (03B65) Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10)

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