When Are Nash Equilibria Independent of the Distribution of Agents' Characteristics?

DOI10.2307/2297742zbMath0589.90017OpenAlexW2085680383MaRDI QIDQ3718448

Theodore C. Bergstrom, Hal R. Varian

Publication date: 1985

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/3rn170cf

zbMATH Keywords

distribution of agents' characteristicsexamples of Nash equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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