Social Aggregation Rules and Continuity

DOI10.2307/1880762zbMath0479.90018OpenAlexW2035730959MaRDI QIDQ3938791

Graciela Chichilnisky

Publication date: 1982

Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1880762

zbMATH Keywords

gradientanonymityimpossibility resultsmooth preferencescontinuous social aggregation rulerespect of unanimity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (27)

The Moebius strip and a social choice paradox ⋮ The topological approach to the aggregation of preferences ⋮ Limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium with or without short sales ⋮ Bounded response of aggregated preferences ⋮ Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel ⋮ An axiomatic approach to finite means ⋮ Social evaluation functionals with an arbitrary set of alternatives ⋮ A reformulation of Chichilnisky's impossibility theorem ⋮ On the robustness of the impossibility result in the topological approach to social choice ⋮ Topological social choice: Reply to Le Breton and Uriarte ⋮ Structural instability of decision majority rules ⋮ Aggregation of utility and social choice: a topological characterization. ⋮ Singularity and Arrow's paradox ⋮ Continuous selections from the Pareto correspondence and non-manipulability in exchange economies ⋮ Abstract aggregations and proximity preservation: an impossibility result ⋮ Demystifying the `metric approach to social compromise with the unanimity criterion' ⋮ Social decision for a measure society ⋮ Is a continuous rational social aggregation impossible on continuum spaces? ⋮ Continuous-valued social choice ⋮ Kaplow-Shavell welfarism without continuity ⋮ Topological social choice ⋮ Collective judgement: combining individual value judgements ⋮ A projection property and Arrow's impossibility theorem ⋮ Continuous social decision procedures ⋮ Utility functions for Debreu's 'excess demands' ⋮ Aggregation of preferences: The fuzzy case ⋮ Anonymity and continuous social choice

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