An Axiomatic Theory of Tournament Aggregation

DOI10.1287/MOOR.3.4.334zbMath0395.90002OpenAlexW2003554926MaRDI QIDQ4178728

Bernard Monjardet

Publication date: 1978

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.3.4.334

zbMATH Keywords

PreferencesSimple GamesSocial ChoiceTournament AgGregation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Ordered sets (06A99)

Related Items (19)

SOME ORDER DUALITIES IN LOGIC, GAMES AND CHOICES ⋮ Stability conditions for consensus functions defined on \(n\)-trees ⋮ The structure of non-manipulable social choice rules on a tree ⋮ Solving the Kemeny ranking aggregation problem with quantum optimization algorithms ⋮ Maximal Condorcet domains ⋮ Aggregation of preferences: a review ⋮ The median procedure in cluster analysis and social choice theory ⋮ Arrow's theorem: Unusual domains and extended codomains ⋮ Explicit form of neutral social decision rules for basic rationality conditions. ⋮ Majority rule on rhombus tilings and Condorcet super-domains ⋮ Consensus weak hierarchies ⋮ Computational application of the mathematical theory of democracy to Arrow's impossibility theorem (how dictatorial are Arrow's dictators?) ⋮ The history of social choice in Russia and the Soviet Union ⋮ Distance and consensus for preference relations corresponding to ordered partitions ⋮ Arrowian characterizations of latticial federation consensus functions ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Consensus functions defined on trees ⋮ Heights of simple games ⋮ Faithful consensus methods for n-trees

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