A Bargaining Model Where Parties Make Errors

DOI10.2307/2938376zbMath0783.90127OpenAlexW1993073641MaRDI QIDQ4271332

Hans Carlsson

Publication date: 9 January 1994

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2938376

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationbilateral bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (14)

Implementing egalitarianism in a class of Nash demand games ⋮ Robustness to strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game ⋮ Reasonable Nash demand games ⋮ Noise-proof equilibria in two-action signaling games ⋮ Mixed-strategy equilibria in the Nash demand game ⋮ Pledge-and-review bargaining ⋮ (In)efficiency and equitability of equilibrium outcomes in a family of bargaining games ⋮ Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions: a simple Nash program ⋮ Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution ⋮ Bargaining with revoking costs ⋮ BARGAINING POWER IN THE NASH DEMAND GAME AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH ⋮ Noisy equilibrium selection in coordination games ⋮ Random-settlement arbitration and the generalized Nash solution: one-shot and infinite-horizon cases ⋮ Rewarding moderate behavior in a dynamic Nash demand game

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