First-Price Auctions With General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

DOI10.3982/ECTA13958zbMath1420.91108MaRDI QIDQ4612491

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Publication date: 31 January 2019

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

common valuesinterdependent valuesinformation structurewelfare boundsfirst-price auctionsurplusrevenueprivate valuesreserve priceBayes correlated equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (15)

Correlation-robust auction design ⋮ On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions ⋮ All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents' values ⋮ Informationally robust trade and limits to contagion ⋮ Learning rivals' information in interdependent value auctions ⋮ Auctions with flexible information acquisition ⋮ ESTIMATION OF (STATIC OR DYNAMIC) GAMES UNDER EQUILIBRIUM MULTIPLICITY ⋮ Distributionally robust pricing in independent private value auctions ⋮ Worst‐case equilibria in first‐price auctions ⋮ Information disclosure on the contest mechanism ⋮ Separating equilibria in auctions with two types of bidders ⋮ Auctions ⋮ Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness ⋮ Private and common value auctions with ambiguity over correlation ⋮ Dutch vs. first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders

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