Level-$k$ Mechanism Design

DOI10.1093/restud/rdy031zbMath1479.91068OpenAlexW3125068440MaRDI QIDQ5014001

Geoffroy de Clippel, Roberto Serrano, Rene Saran

Publication date: 3 December 2021

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdy031

zbMATH Keywords

bounded rationalitymechanism designrevelation principleincentive compatibilitylevel-\(k\) reasoning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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