Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition
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Publication:5441827
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00796.xzbMath1133.91008OpenAlexW2793317277MaRDI QIDQ5441827
Patrick Bajari, C. Lanier Benkard, Jonathan Levin
Publication date: 15 February 2008
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w10450.pdf
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