Stability of the Groves and Ledyard mechanism (Q1108174)

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Stability of the Groves and Ledyard mechanism
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    Stability of the Groves and Ledyard mechanism (English)
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    1988
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    It is shown that the Nash equilibria of the game defined by the Groves and Ledyard mechanism [see \textit{T. Groves} and \textit{J. Ledyard}, Econometrica 45, 783-809 (1977; Zbl 0363.90015)] in a public good economy can be made locally stable under Cournot best-replay behavior and general assumptions on preferences.
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    stability
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    Nash equilibria
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    public good economy
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    Cournot best-replay behavior
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