Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences (Q553521)

From MaRDI portal
Revision as of 07:58, 4 July 2024 by ReferenceBot (talk | contribs) (‎Changed an Item)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences
scientific article

    Statements

    Collectively rational voting rules for simple preferences (English)
    0 references
    0 references
    27 July 2011
    0 references
    This paper discusses transitivity of social preference relations and weaker versions of it. Two kinds of restricted domains of individual preferences are considered. The first is characterized by all preferences having at most two indifference classes. The other is characterized by any set of three alternatives being partitioned into two non-empty subsets such that alternatives in one set are strictly preferred to alternatives in the other set. It is proved that, for fixed such domains, among the voting rules satisfying monotonicity, anonymity and neutrality, majority voting is the unique satisfying transitivity, although other voting rules satisfy acyclicity.
    0 references
    transitivity
    0 references
    quasi-transitivity
    0 references
    acyclicity
    0 references
    majority rule
    0 references
    voting rule
    0 references
    collective rationality
    0 references

    Identifiers