Stable and extremely unequal

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111101zbMath1521.91246arXiv2108.06587OpenAlexW3193890340MaRDI QIDQ6047334

Alfred Galichon, Marc Henry, Octavia Ghelfi

Publication date: 12 September 2023

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2108.06587

zbMATH Keywords

lexicographic orderstable matchingaligned preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (1)

The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice

Cites Work

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• On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings
• On cores and indivisibility
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation
• Rank-maximal matchings
• Assignment Problems
• Axioms for Deferred Acceptance
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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