A Class of Dominance Solvable Common-Value Auctions
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Recommendations
- Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions
- Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information
- Dominance solvability of large k-price auctions
- Dominant strategies, superior information, and winner's curse in second-price auctions
- Dominance or maximin: How to solve an English auction
Cited in
(16)- Dominant strategies, superior information, and winner's curse in second-price auctions
- Private information revelation in common-value auctions
- Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information
- Comparative static effects of number of bidders and public information on behavior in second-price common value auctions
- Dominance or maximin: How to solve an English auction
- Comprehensive rationalizability
- Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information
- Licensing a common value innovation when signaling strength may backfire
- Almost common value auctions and discontinuous equilibria
- Equilibrium selection in common-value second-price auctions
- Industry concentration in common value auctions: theory and evidence
- Dominance solvability of large k-price auctions
- Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions
- Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values
- Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions
- On dominance solvable auctions in the general symmetric model
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