A new allocation method for simple bargaining problems: the Shapley rule

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-00795-3_33MaRDI QIDQ5171807zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Francesc Carreras, Guillermo Owen

Publication date 12 February 2015

Published in Operations Research Proceedings (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-00795-3_33

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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(5)

• A new rule for the problem of sharing the revenue from museum passes
• A new Shapley value-based rule for distributing delay costs in stochastic projects
• A new analysis of a simple model of fair allocation
• Shapley Value vs. Proportional Rule in Cooperative Affairs
• Pure bargaining problems and the Shapley rule

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