Absolutely expedient algorithms for learning Nash equilibria

DOI10.1007/BF02830892MaRDI QIDQ1322380zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors V. V. Phansalkar, P. S. Sastry, M. A. L. Thathachar

Publication date 1994

Published in Proceedings of the Indian Academy of Sciences. Mathematical Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02830892

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumdecentralized learningteam concept

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Stochastic learning and adaptive control (93E35)

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• Decentralized learning in finite Markov chains
• Decentralized learning of Nash equilibria in multi-person stochastic games with incomplete information
• Dynamic noncooperative game theory
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Learning Algorithms for Two-Person Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Incomplete Information: A Unified Approach
• Learning Optimal Discriminant Functions through a Cooperative Game of Automata
• Relaxation Labeling with Learning Automata
• epsilon-optimality of a general class of learning algorithms

Cited in

(15)

• Verified learning without regret. From algorithmic game theory to distributed systems with mechanized complexity guarantees
• Learning through reinforcement and replicator dynamics
• Transient and asymptotic dynamics of reinforcement learning in games
• Learning algorithms for repeated bimatrix Nash games with incomplete information
• On learning algorithms for Nash equilibria
• An N-player sequential stochastic game with identical payoffs
• Global Nash convergence of Foster and Young's regret testing
• Learning behavior of variable-structure stochastic automata in a three-person zero-sum game
• Finding multiple Nash equilibria via machine learning-supported Gröbner bases
• Distributed learning of the global maximum in a two-player stochastic game with identical payoffs
• A strategic learning algorithm for state-based games
• Learning convex partitions and computing game-theoretic equilibria from best response queries
• A note on bimatrix games with an unknown payoff matrix
• Learning automata in feedforward connectionist systems
• Specification-Guided Learning of Nash Equilibria with High Social Welfare

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