On learning algorithms for Nash equilibria
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Cites work
- A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
- Adaptive game playing using multiplicative weights
- An iterative method of solving a game
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5485549 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3205074 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3225772 (Why is no real title available?)
- Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy
- Mixed equilibria and dynamical systems arising from fictitious play in perturbed games
- Multiplicative updates outperform generic no-regret learning in congestion games (extended abstract)
- The multiplicative weights update method: a meta-algorithm and applications
- The Nonstochastic Multiarmed Bandit Problem
Cited in
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- Finding multiple Nash equilibria via machine learning-supported Gröbner bases
- Learning convex partitions and computing game-theoretic equilibria from best response queries
- Learning strict Nash equilibria through reinforcement
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- A competitive rate allocation game
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- On gradient-based learning in continuous games
- GENERAL PROOF OF CONVERGENCE OF THE NASH-Q-LEARNING ALGORITHM
- Fast algorithm for recovering the true solution with fixed weight of a system of linear Boolean equations with noised right-hand side
- Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium
- A general class of no-regret learning algorithms and game-theoretic equilibria.
- Specification-Guided Learning of Nash Equilibria with High Social Welfare
- Swim till you sink: computing the limit of a game
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