Addressing flaws in RFID authentication protocols

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-25578-6_17MaRDI QIDQ3104736zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mohammad Habibi, M. R. Aref, Di Ma

Publication date 16 December 2011

Published in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25578-6_17

zbMATH Keywords

authentication protocoldesynchronization attackprivacy analysisRFID

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Data encryption (aspects in computer science) (68P25) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

Recommendations

• Cryptanalysis of the Cho et al. protocol: a hash-based RFID tag mutual authentication protocol
• Traceable Privacy of Recent Provably-Secure RFID Protocols
• Towards a lightweight, secure, and untraceable RFID authentication protocol
• Weaknesses in two RFID authentication protocols
• Weaknesses in two recent lightweight RFID authentication protocols

Cites work

• A New Formal Proof Model for RFID Location Privacy
• A new framework for RFID privacy
• Financial Cryptography and Data Security
• On Privacy Models for RFID
• Passive Attacks on a Class of Authentication Protocols for RFID
• Reducing Time Complexity in RFID Systems
• Traceable Privacy of Recent Provably-Secure RFID Protocols
• Vulnerability analysis of RFID protocols for tag ownership transfer

Cited in

(5)

• On the security of RFID anti-counting security protocol (ACSP)
• Cryptanalysis of the Cho et al. protocol: a hash-based RFID tag mutual authentication protocol
• Towards a lightweight, secure, and untraceable RFID authentication protocol
• Traceable Privacy of Recent Provably-Secure RFID Protocols
• Vulnerability analysis of RFID protocols for tag ownership transfer

This page was built for publication: Addressing flaws in RFID authentication protocols

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3104736)