Agent-based model of tax control under information spreading

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-66379-6_6MaRDI QIDQ7031365zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Suriya Sh. Kumacheva, Elena Gubar, Ekaterina Zhitkova, Edgar J. Sanchez Carrera

Publication date 6 February 2025

Full work available at URL https://hdl.handle.net/2158/1397453

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Applications of game theory (91A80) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

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