A General Characterization of Optimal Income Tax Enforcement

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00040MaRDI QIDQ3839975zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors P. Chander, Louis L. Wilde

Publication date 10 August 1998

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00040

zbMATH Keywords

misreportingoptimal income tax

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

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Cited in

(17)

• Effective federal individual income tax functions: A specification search
• Optimal tax inspection strategy
• A mathematical model of optimal tax inspection
• Over the borderline: how the characteristics of lines shape optimal tax policy
• Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes
• The option value of tax delinquency: Theory
• Tax Riots
• Tax Evasion, Concealment and the Optimal Linear Income Tax
• Optimal Auditing with Heterogeneous Income Sources
• Sorting the good guys from bad: on the optimal audit structure with ex-ante information acquisition
• Analysis of economic behaviour in evolutionary model of tax control under information diffusion
• A quantitative analysis of tax enforcement and optimal monetary policy
• On existence of pure strategy equilibrium with endogenous income
• Data-driven auditing of business and self-employment earnings
• Agent-based model of tax control under information spreading
• Repetitive risk aversion
• Optimal observability in a linear income tax

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