Optimal Auditing with Heterogeneous Income Sources

DOI10.2307/2527224MaRDI QIDQ4375452zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Inés Macho-Stadler, David Pérez-Castrillo

Publication date 5 February 1998

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2527224

zbMATH Keywords

optimal enforcement policyoptimal auditing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

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Cited in

(7)

• Sorting the good guys from bad: on the optimal audit structure with ex-ante information acquisition
• Effect of heterogeneous consumers auditing in hard-to-tax markets
• A General Characterization of Optimal Income Tax Enforcement
• Optimal auditing and insurance in a dynamic model of tax compliance
• Optimal audit policies with correlated types
• Compliance with Endogenous Audit Probabilities
• Auditing Shaked and Shanthikumar's `excess wealth'

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