Approximately strategyproof tournament rules in the probabilistic setting

DOI10.4230/LIPICS.ITCS.2021.14MaRDI QIDQ7229298zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Kimberly Ding, S. Matthew Weinberg

Publication date 15 April 2026

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPICS.ITCS.2021.14

zbMATH Keywords

incentive compatibilityrecursive analysissocial choice theorytournaments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of computing (68Qxx)

Cites work

• Can strategizing in round-robin subtournaments be avoided?
• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
• Condorcet-consistent and approximately strategyproof tournament rules
• Handbook of Computational Social Choice
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7650351 (Why is no real title available?)
• Optimal Strategies for a Generalized "Scissors, Paper, and Stone" Game
• Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
• The bipartisan set of a tournament game
• Tournament solutions and majority voting

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