Bargaining Sets of Majority Voting Games

DOI10.1287/MOOR.1070.0275MaRDI QIDQ5388065zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ron Holzman, Bezalel Peleg, Peter Sudhölter

Publication date 27 May 2008

Published in Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/786ed989b201b4102cd0dd488b6c0e45a49447a3

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining setmajority ruleNTU gamevoting game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• On the non-emptiness of the Mas-Colell bargaining set
• The demand bargaining set: General characterization and application to majority games
• Balancedness, nonemptiness of the core and the existence of a majority equilibrium
• Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule
• On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games

Cited in

(9)

• Bargaining sets with small coalitions
• The bargaining set of four-person balanced games
• Majority rule in a stochastic model of bargaining
• Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4202067 (Why is no real title available?)
• On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games
• Professor Peter Sudhölter (1957--2024)
• Subbalanced games and bargaining sets
• Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule

This page was built for publication: Bargaining Sets of Majority Voting Games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5388065)