Bargaining solutions with non-standard objectives

DOI10.1007/PL00013705MaRDI QIDQ5954191zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Peter B. Linhart

Publication date 22 September 2002

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00013705

zbMATH Keywords

\(\alpha\)-individually rational strategyincomplete informationmaximum profitmaximum regretpure-strategy solutionsscaled-bid bargaining game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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(6)

• Minimax-regret strategies for bargaining over several variables
• Bargaining with independence of higher or irrelevant claims
• SCENARIOS FOR PRICE DETERMINATION IN INCOMPLETE MARKETS
• Bargaining and inequity aversion: on the efficiency of the double auction
• Uncovered bargaining solutions
• Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty

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