Bayesian Equilibria of Finite Two-Person Games with Incomplete Information

DOI10.1287/MNSC.21.3.313MaRDI QIDQ4062978zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Joseph T. Jun. Howson, Robert W. Rosenthal

Publication date 1974

Published in Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.21.3.313

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Bayesian problems; characterization of Bayes procedures (62C10) 2-person games (91A05) Noncooperative games (91A10) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Cited in

(10)

• A global Newton method to compute Nash equilibria.
• Ex post Nash equilibrium in linear Bayesian games for decision making in multi-environments
• On perfect Nash equilibria of polymatrix games
• Computing approximate Nash equilibria in polymatrix games
• Games of incomplete information: a framework based on belief functions
• Games of incomplete information: a framework based on belief functions
• Quantal response equilibrium as a structural model for estimation: the missing manual
• Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory
• Enumeration of all the extreme equilibria in game theory: bimatrix and polymatrix games
• Computing Nash equilibria by iterated polymatrix approximation

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