Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory
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The referred paper deals with the analysis and survey of homotopy-based methods of computing the equilibria of strategic games. The main contribution to game theory consists in an overview and discussion of a wide scale of the existing computation methods with special regard to the strength of the homotopy-based approaches, and in the presentation of their further extension to extensive form and dynamic games.
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Cites work
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Cited in
(42)- A variable-dimension homotopy on networks for computing linear spatial equilibria
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