Computing Equilibria of Two-Person Games from the Extensive Form
From MaRDI portal
Cited in
(7)- A bounded-rationality approach to the study of noncooperative games
- The complexity of two-person zero-sum games in extensive form
- A global Newton method to compute Nash equilibria.
- Finding mixed strategies with small supports in extensive form games
- The complexity of computing a (quasi-)perfect equilibrium for an \(n\)-player extensive form game
- A new sequence form approach for the enumeration and refinement of all extreme Nash equilibria for extensive form games
- Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory
This page was built for publication: Computing Equilibria of Two-Person Games from the Extensive Form
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5650549)