Behavioral study of dashboard mechanisms

DOI10.1007/978-3-032-18660-7_5MaRDI QIDQ7299257zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Paula Kayongo, Jason D. Hartline

Publication date 17 July 2026

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-18660-7_5

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Internet topics (68M11) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites work

• Cursed Equilibrium
• Does displaying probabilities affect bidding in first-price auctions?
• Explaining overbidding in first price auctions using controlled lotteries
• Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions
• Individual behavior of first-price auctions: the importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets
• Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
• Nonlinear behavior in sealed bid first price auctions
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions
• Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: evidence from the residency match

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