Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00255-2MaRDI QIDQ1763203zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Patrick J. Kehoe, Fabrizio Perri

Publication date 22 February 2005

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00255-2

zbMATH Keywords

DecentralizationDefaultEnforcement constraintsIncomplete marketsRisk-sharingSovereign debtSustainable equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Recommendations

• Debt Constrained Asset Markets
• Default and efficient debt markets.
• Incentives and competitive allocations in exchange economies with incomplete markets
• Constrained efficiency without commitment
• Bubbles and Self-Enforcing Debt

Cites work

• Debt Constrained Asset Markets
• Efficiency, Equilibrium, and Asset Pricing with Risk of Default
• Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment
• Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies
• International Business Cycles with Endogenous Incomplete Markets
• Liquidity Constrained Markets Versus Debt Constrained Markets
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Sustainable Plans and Mutual Default
• The Welfare Adjustment Process: Its Stability Properties
• WELFARE ECONOMICS AND EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY

Cited in

(5)

• EMU, EU, market integration and consumption smoothing
• Optimal risk sharing and borrowing constraints in a continuous-time model with limited commitment
• Using capital mobility to enforce commitment
• On the optimal design of a financial stability fund
• Endogenous trading constraints with incomplete asset markets

This page was built for publication: Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1763203)