Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00255-2MaRDI QIDQ1763203zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Patrick J. Kehoe, Fabrizio Perri

Publication date 22 February 2005

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Incomplete marketsDefaultRisk-sharingDecentralizationEnforcement constraintsSovereign debtSustainable equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Dynamic games (91A25)

Recommendations

• Debt Constrained Asset Markets
• Default and efficient debt markets.
• Incentives and competitive allocations in exchange economies with incomplete markets
• Constrained efficiency without commitment
• Bubbles and Self-Enforcing Debt

Cites work

• Debt Constrained Asset Markets
• Efficiency, Equilibrium, and Asset Pricing with Risk of Default
• Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment
• Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies
• International Business Cycles with Endogenous Incomplete Markets
• Liquidity Constrained Markets Versus Debt Constrained Markets
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Sustainable Plans and Mutual Default
• The Welfare Adjustment Process: Its Stability Properties
• WELFARE ECONOMICS AND EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY

Cited in

(3)

• Endogenous trading constraints with incomplete asset markets
• EMU, EU, market integration and consumption smoothing
• Optimal risk sharing and borrowing constraints in a continuous-time model with limited commitment

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