Computing a Walrasian Equilibrium in Iterative Auctions with Multiple Differentiated Items

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-45030-3_44MaRDI QIDQ2872111zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kazuo Murota, Akiyoshi Shioura, Zaifu Yang

Publication date 14 January 2014

Published in Algorithms and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45030-3_44

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

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(13)

• Time bounds for iterative auctions: a unified approach by discrete convex analysis
• Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
• Exact bounds for steepest descent algorithms of $L$-convex function minimization
• A dynamic auction for differentiated items under price rigidities
• Walrasian's characterization and a universal ascending auction
• Computing Walrasian equilibria: fast algorithms and structural properties
• Note on time bounds of two-phase algorithms for \(L\)-convex function minimization
• Strategyproof allocation mechanisms with endowments and M-convex distributional constraints
• Combinatorial optimization. Abstracts from the workshop held November 7--13, 2021 (hybrid meeting)
• Iterative auction design for tree valuations
• A fair and truthful mechanism with limited subsidy
• A flow-based ascending auction to compute buyer-optimal Walrasian prices
• A simplified analysis of the ascending auction to sell a matroid base

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