Consistent social ranking solutions

DOI10.1007/S00355-023-01502-1MaRDI QIDQ6570724zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Takahiro Suzuki, Masahide Horita

Publication date 10 July 2024

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00355-023-01502-1

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionsconsistencysocial ranking solution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Review text

This article introduces a new characterization of lexicographic excellence solution (LES) and its dual (DLES), which it demonstrates to be the only social ranking solutions (SRS) that achieve consistency, neutrality, weak coalitional anonymity, and complete dominance. A novelty of the study is the consideration of multiple sets of feasible coalitions, domains of coalitions. The domain of coalitions in which the SRS is formulated is assumed to be variable. Consistency in the proposed framework is determined in the partition of the domain of coalitions rather than in the partition of societies. A consequence of this is that Borda rule and majority rule as SRSs do not meet the criteria for consistency.

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Cites work

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Cited in

(4)

• Selecting the most relevant elements from a ranking over sets
• Desirability and social ranking
• Feature selection with a lexicographic social ranking method
• A unified understanding of majority rule, CP majority rule, and their variants

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