Costly Search and Recruiting

DOI10.2307/2526861MaRDI QIDQ4729590zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Peter Howitt, R. Preston McAfee

Publication date 1987

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2526861

zbMATH Keywords

job searchlabor marketsearch equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Economic growth models (91B62)

Recommendations

• Applications and interviews: firms' recruiting decisions in a frictional labour market
• Business Cycles with Costly Search and Recruiting
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Cited in

(12)

• Employment cycles in search equilibrium
• Informal job search through social networks and vacancy creation
• Self-fulfilling expectations, history, and big push: A search equilibrium model of unemployment
• The agency costs of on-the-job search
• Applications and interviews: firms' recruiting decisions in a frictional labour market
• Persistence and volatility of Beveridge cycles
• The Right Man for the Job
• Does search boost efficiency?
• Tracing externalities as sources of indeterminacy.
• Returns to scale in a matching model of the labor market
• Search complementarities, aggregate fluctuations, and fiscal policy
• A note on indeterminacy of unemployment equilibrium

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