Demand Signalling Under Unobservable Effort in Franchising: Linear and Nonlinear Price Contracts
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Recommendations
- Supply contracts in manufacturer-retailer interactions with manufacturer-quality and retailer effort-induced demand
- Designing supply contracts: contract type and information asymmetry
- Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability
- Correlated Contracts in Oligopoly
- The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
Cited in
(13)- Transaction-efficiency analysis of franchising arrangements through chance cross-constrained game theory
- Supply chain contracts for capacity decisions under symmetric and asymmetric information
- Coopetition in intermodal freight transport services
- Should purchasing activities be outsourced along with production?
- Trade credit contract with limited liability in the supply chain with budget constraints
- Coordination of cooperative cost-reduction efforts in a supply chain partnership
- On sales effort and pricing decisions under alternative risk criteria
- Optimal supply diversification strategy under supply disruption
- Wholesale price discrimination with interdependent retailers
- Volume discounting coordinates a supply chain effectively when demand is sensitive to both price and sales effort
- Optimal price/advertising menus for two-sided media platforms
- Partial information sharing in supply chains with ARMA demand
- Impact of product pricing and timing of investment decisions on supply chain co-opetition
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