Driving Forces Behind Informal Sanctions

DOI10.1111/J.1468-0262.2005.00644.XMaRDI QIDQ5393916zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr, U. Fischbacher

Publication date 24 October 2006

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33524

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationfairnessreciprocitysanctioningsocial normspitefulness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Why punish? Norms and revenge in an experimental game
• Fairness, spite, and intentions: testing different motives behind punishment in a prisoners' dilemma game
• When punishment fails: Research on sanctions, intentions and non-cooperation
• Fairness, public good, and emotional aspects of punishment behavior
• Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism

Cited in

(34)

• A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments
• The hot-versus-cold effect in a punishment game: a multi-round experimental study
• Peer-punishment in a cooperation and a coordination game
• Inequality and inter-group conflicts: experimental evidence
• Do economists punish less?
• Rare but severe concerted punishment that favors cooperation
• Selfish punishers. An experimental investigation of designated punishment behavior in public goods
• Conditional cooperation and cultural worldviews
• Evolution of altruistic punishment in heterogeneous populations
• Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible
• Supervise me if you can. Relational feelings, incentive pays and supervisory violations
• The effects of centralized power and institutional legitimacy on collective action
• Inequality aversion and reciprocity in moonlighting games
• When punishment fails: Research on sanctions, intentions and non-cooperation
• Different carrots and different sticks: Do we reward and punish differently than we approve and disapprove?
• A theory of reciprocity
• Good manners: signaling social preferences
• Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment
• The construction of peer punishment preference: how central power shapes prosocial and antisocial punishment behaviors
• Identity, utility, and cooperative behaviour: an evolutionary perspective
• Selfish altruism, fierce cooperation and the predator
• Inequality aversion and antisocial punishment
• Strategy vs. direct-response method: evidence from a large online experiment on simple social dilemmas
• Insuperable strategies in two-player and reducible multi-player games
• Fairness, spite, and intentions: testing different motives behind punishment in a prisoners' dilemma game
• Cooperation under endogenous punishment in the spatial public goods game
• The impact of inequality preferences on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games
• Promote or hinder? The role of punishment in the emergence of cooperation
• Expressed preferences and behavior in experimental games
• Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism
• What norms trigger punishment?
• Sanctions as revelation regimes
• Punishment, inequality, and welfare: a public good experiment
• Aversion to norm-breaking: A model

This page was built for publication: Driving Forces Behind Informal Sanctions

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5393916)