Dynamic Auctions

DOI10.2307/2297542MaRDI QIDQ3470212zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Daniel R. Vincent

Publication date 1990

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2297542

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingBertrand-like competitiondynamic trading gameinformed selleruncertain qualityuninformed buyersunique perfect sequential equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economic growth models (91B62)

Recommendations

• Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
• Auction and the informed seller problem
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Internet auctions with many traders

Cited in

(11)

• Dynamic trading with developing adverse selection
• Hybrid auctions.
• Equilibria and Pareto optimal of markets with adverse selection
• DEA based auctions
• Information about sellers' past behavior in the market for lemons
• Trilateral escalation in the dollar auction
• Dynamic pricing for impatient bidders
• Dynamic Position Auctions with Consumer Search
• Selling a lemon under demand uncertainty
• Only time will tell: credible dynamic signaling
• Multidimensional auctions

This page was built for publication: Dynamic Auctions

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3470212)