Dynamic expert incentives in teams

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.10.005MaRDI QIDQ1995457zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tsz-Ning Wong, Lily Ling Yang

Publication date 23 February 2021

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.10.005

zbMATH Keywords

information acquisitionBayesian learningpersuasionfree-ridingvoluntary disclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Recommendations

• Monitoring experts
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3904454
• A model of expertise
• Sorting expertise
• Robust incentives for information acquisition

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3992265 (Why is no real title available?)
• Breakdowns
• Career concerns with exponential learning
• Informational lobbying under the shadow of political pressure
• Learning to disagree in a game of experimentation
• Reputation for Quality
• Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits

Cited in

(9)

• Delegated expertise: implementability with peer-monitoring
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2094740 (Why is no real title available?)
• Changing One's Mind when the Facts Change: Incentives of Experts and the Design of Reporting Protocols
• Uncertainty-driven cooperation
• Independent versus collective expertise
• Prevention of herding by experts
• Team incentives with imperfect mutual inference
• Sorting expertise
• Brief announcement: Towards an abstract model of user retention dynamics

This page was built for publication: Dynamic expert incentives in teams

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1995457)