Efficiency of scalar-parameterized mechanisms
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- Almost budget balanced mechanisms with scalar bids for allocation of a divisible good
- The complexity of resource allocation and price mechanisms under bounded rationality
- Equilibrium strategies for multiple interdictors on a common network
- Primary versus secondary infrastructure capacity allocation mechanisms
- The Stackelberg equilibria of the Kelly mechanism
- Generalising diagonal strict concavity property for uniqueness of Nash equilibrium
- Mechanism design for demand management in energy communities
- Efficient advert assignment
- Optimal cost sharing for capacitated facility location games
- On the efficiency of markets with two-sided proportional allocation mechanisms
- Auction design for the efficient allocation of service capacity under congestion
- On the Efficiency of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism for Divisible Resources
- The price of anarchy and the design of scalable resource allocation mechanisms
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1560852 (Why is no real title available?)
- Mechanism design with efficiency and equality considerations
- The Efficiency of Resource Allocation Mechanisms for Budget-Constrained Users
- On the efficiency of the proportional allocation mechanism for divisible resources
- Nash equilibrium design and price-based coordination in hierarchical systems
- A game theoretic view of efficiency loss in resource allocation
- On Efficient Resource Allocation in Communication Networks
- An efficient Nash-implementation mechanism for network resource allocation
- Gradient-based local formulations of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism for truthful minimization of social convex objectives
- A note on the tight simplification of mechanisms
- A truthful mechanism design for distributed optimisation algorithms in networks with self-interested agents
- Combinatorial exchange mechanisms for efficient bandwidth allocation
- Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms
- An efficient and almost budget balanced cost sharing method
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