Emergence of price-taking behavior
This article develops a disequilibrium approach to perfectly competitive equilibrium prices. It does so by assuming that all rates of exchange and substitution are expressible in terms of a money commodity. Differences in these rates among individuals become thus differences in personal prices or valuations inducing trade until valuations coincide, which coincidence is shown to correspond to the perfectly competitive outcome. This conclusion is independent of the circumstances surrounding trade while agents are allowed to behave in adaptive, even myopic manner rather than according to some notion of rationality. Moreover, ``modulo a money commodity, this paper argues that bilateral exchange may serve [such agents] well. No market participants or products enter or exit the economy. Each phase of trading only reallocates stable total holdings among fixed agents. It is seen as one session of market-clearing double auction, which somehow ``shrinks the core and thereby repeated sessions substitute for replication of agents. Three are the kinds of readers who would be interested in such a study: First, behavioral or mathematical economists, concerned with achieving competitive equilibrium in a constructive manner; second, computer scientists engaged with distributed or parallel programming; and third, mathematicians or optimizers dealing with non-smooth data.
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- Getting to a Competitive Equilibrium
- Decentralised bilateral trading, competition for bargaining partners and the ``law of one price
- Bilateral exchange and competitive equilibrium
- Tracking the invisible hand: convergence of double auctions to competive equilibrium
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- Bases, tools and principles for variational analysis
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- Calculus without derivatives
- Convex Analysis
- Decentralized pricing and the equivalence between Nash and Walrasian equilibrium
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- Edgeworth-Allocations in an Exchange Economy with Many Traders
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- Nonlinear optimization.
- On measures, pricing and sharing of risk
- On the convergence of von Neumann's alternating projection algorithm for two sets
- Order books, markets and convex analysis
- Random block coordinate descent methods for linearly constrained optimization over networks
- Repeated trade and the velocity of money
- Retrading in market games.
- Sequential Bargaining as a Noncooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium
- The limit-price mechanism.
- Variational Analysis
- WELFARE ECONOMICS AND EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY
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- Convergence of strategic behavior to price taking
- Walrasian allocations without price-taking behavior
- On the behavioral foundations of the law of supply and demand: Human convergence and robot randomness
- Market equilibria and money
- An evolutionary finance model with short selling and endogenous asset supply
- Submodular financial markets with frictions
- Games and cost of change
- Market takeovers in medieval trade
- Tracking the invisible hand: convergence of double auctions to competive equilibrium
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- Via order markets towards price-taking equilibrium
- Convexity, convolution and competitive equilibrium
- Accessibility of Pareto optima
- Decentralized pure exchange processes on networks
- Reaching an equilibrium of prices and holdings of goods through direct buying and selling
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