Environmental damage reduction: when countries face conflicting objectives

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-28863-0_3MaRDI QIDQ6619756zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors M. Ángeles Caraballo, Asunción Zapata, L. Monroy, A. Mármol

Publication date 16 October 2024

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-28863-0_3

zbMATH Keywords

emissionsequilibrianon-cooperative gameperceptiontolerance threshold

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical programming (90Cxx)

Recommendations

• International pollution problems: Unilateral initiatives by environmental groups in one country
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• Game theory of pollution: national policies and their international effects

Cites work

• Equilibria with vector-valued utilities and preference information. The analysis of a mixed duopoly

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